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Abstract: Aboriginal self-government is changing the governance landscape in 
Canada. This paper focuses on a little-studied aspect of aboriginal self-govern-
ment arrangements, namely the horizontal dispersion of power among non-gov-
ernmental institutions in the policy process. Nunavut, the Canadian territory 
created in 1999, offers a good example of this horizontal power dispersion. The 
Government of Nunavut is the only Canadian public government stemming from 
a land claim agreement. This creates a special set of obligations and entrenches 
a horizontal multilevel governance model, with a unique model of governance 
between a public government, the government of Nunavut (GN), that serves a pre-
dominantly Inuit population, and a nonprofit beneficiary organization, Nunavut 
Tunngavik Inc.(NTI), representing the Inuit of Nunavut. In this paper we map out 
the authority and legitimacy of these levels of governance and the impacts of this 
system on Nunavut public policies and access to resource development revenues.
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1. Multilevel Governance in Nunavut
NTI, the GN, and the Federal Government are partners, for better or worse. I think 
that as partners there needs to be more clearly defined roles and responsibilities in 
the area of social and cultural issues. Inuit organizations have a huge role to play in 
ensuring a healthy population. The GN and the Federal government have important 
roles to play in ensuring Nunavut has the essential tools to function. I think the 
three partners have a long way to go to achieve the sort of positive, streamlined, and 
helpful relationship which will allow for sustained success.
– Natan Obed, NTI Social Policy Director, Globe and Mail online discussion, 
Aug. 19, 2009
The governance landscape of northern Canada is evolving rapidly through the 
settlement of aboriginal land claims that create a new distribution of power. The 
agreements often establish new levels of governance through self-government 
arrangements and redefine the policy-making environment by giving aboriginal 
organizations a defined and protected role in public policy.
This paper focuses on the multilevel governance structure established by the 
Nunavut Land Claims Agreement (NLCA) and the creation of Nunavut in 1999. 
Nunavut is developing a unique model of governance between a public government 
(the government of Nunavut) that serves a predominantly Inuit population and a 
nonprofit beneficiary organization (Nunavut Tunngavik Inc.) representing the Inuit 
of Nunavut. Although the Nunavut government and NTI largely serve and respond 
to the same populations, certain tensions have emerged.
Multilevel governance (MLG) approaches were first developed to take into 
account the increasing complexity and dispersion of power amongst different levels 
of public institutions through the development of the European Union, and have 
since been applied to the study of similar arrangements in other parts of the world.2 
MLG is a response to the inability of the concepts of federalism and intergovern-
mental relations to properly capture recent governance trends in federal systems.3 
This dispersion of power can be observed both vertically, amongst sub-national 
units, through processes of decentralization and regionalization, and horizontally 
through increased participation by non-governmental and quasi-governmental 
actors in policy making.4 Recently, Alcantara and Selles attempted a more pre-
cise definition in order to clearly distinguish MLG from federalism and intergov-
ernmental relations. According to them, MLG has to engage “a variety of actors 
2. In Canada, see for example Nelles and Alcantara 2011; Alcantara and Nelles 2013; Papillon 2008, 
2012; Leo and August 2009.
3. Piattoni 2010; Stein and Turkewitsch 2010.
4. Marks and Hooghe 2004; Peters and Pierre 2004; Stein and Turkewitsch 2010.
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(governmental, nongovernmental, and/or quasi-governmental) located at different 
territorial scales, the outcomes of which are the product of negotiation (decision-
making processes or negotiated order) rather than traditional hierarchical orders 
such as delegation and devolution.”5
The multilevel governance (MLG) approach has been used to describe the gov-
ernance arrangements created by aboriginal land claims settlements in Canada.6 For 
these authors, aboriginal governance arrangements create vertical power sharing 
by empowering sub-provincial units within the Canadian federal system, in what is 
sometimes referred to as nested federalism.7 However, in the case of aboriginal land 
claims settlements in Canada, the dispersion of power occurs between public insti-
tutions and indigenous organizations or institutions. Nunavut provides an exam-
ple of vertical multi-level governance, since it creates a new sub-national unit that 
encompasses a majority of Inuit and therefore allows for a form of self-government.
Traditionally public interest was defined and promoted by public governments, 
but aboriginal organizations sometimes question this premise, arguing that their 
interests cannot be represented by traditional governments and that they alone can 
convey and protect their interests. Aboriginal self-government is therefore a means 
to institutionalize an aboriginal voice in Canadian governance. This situation can 
lead to complex government arrangements as, for example, in the Northwest Ter-
ritories, where at least four major land claims have already been settled.8 In this 
particular case, various boards and organizations have been created and tasked with 
such responsibilities as making recommendations on natural resource manage-
ment, and environmental and social assessment of resource development, a clear 
example of a vertical multilevel governance framework with a dispersion of power 
amongst local and regional aboriginal institutions.
This paper will focus on a little-studied aspect of aboriginal self-government 
arrangements, namely the horizontal dispersion of power among non-governmen-
tal institutions in the policy process. Nunavut offers a good example of this hori-
zontal power dispersion. Like all Canadian territories, Nunavut has a public form 
of government: the Government of Nunavut (GN). However, the GN is the only 
Canadian public government created by a land claims agreement, and this creates a 
special set of obligations and entrenches a horizontal multilevel governance model 
5. Alcantara and Nelles 2013 p. 7.
6. Ladner 2010; Nelles and Alcantara 2011; Timpson 2003; Papillon 2008, 2012; Wilson 2008a; Wil-
son 2008b.
7. Wilson 2008a.
8. The Inuvialuit Final Agreement was signed in 1984, the Gwich’in Comprehensive Land Claim 
Agreement in 1992, the Sathu Dene and Metis Comprehensive Land Claim Agreement in 1994, 
and Tlicho Land Claims and Self-Government Agreement in 2005.
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with the Inuit land claims organizations. In addition, the GN must interact with the 
principal land claims organization in Nunavut, Nunavut Tunngavik Inc. (NTI), the 
legal successor9 to one of the signatories of the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement 
(NLCA) that led to the creation of the Nunavut government. Nunavut is thus a clear 
example of MLG according to the definition proposed by Alcantara and Nelles.10
This situation creates quite a challenge since it establishes two poles of govern-
ance.11 On the one hand is the Government of Nunavut (GN), the public pole in 
charge of day-to-day governance and financed mostly through transfer payments 
from the federal government. On the other hand is NTI, the Inuit pole responsible 
for protecting Inuit rights and providing services to Inuit beneficiaries.12 NTI is 
financed by land claims money and royalties from resource development in Nuna-
vut. In large part the GN and NTI represent and answer to the same population, 
creating competing legitimacies and the potential for disagreements. The two insti-
tutions also serve and are controlled by virtually the same population, since Inuit 
constitute 85 % of the population of Nunavut.
Since the creation of Nunavut, relations between the GN and NTI have been 
strained at times, even if some cooperation has occurred. Inter-organizational con-
flicts are not necessarily a problem per se, but the argument here is that because 
Nunavut’s multilevel governance configuration has created overlapping jurisdic-
tions and competing legitimacies, and because resource development revenues 
mainly benefit the federal government and NTI and the regional Inuit associations 
rather than the government of Nunavut, greater cooperation is required to foster 
and finance better public policies in Nunavut. Conflicts are not so much between 
these two forms of governance as between two competing institutions trying to 
assert their role in the Nunavut governance structure.
The first part of the paper describes Nunavut’s horizontal multilevel governance 
structure. The second part analyzes the role of NTI in public policy and its relation-
ship with the GN. This will allow us to assess the interaction between the two insti-
tutions and the policy coherence of these arrangements. The paper concludes with 
two case studies illustrating the complexity of this relationship: the Government of 
Nunavut procurement policy known as Nunavummi Nangminiqaqtunik Ikajuuti 
(NNI) and the Inuit Language Act.
9. The NLCA was negotiated by the Tungavik Federation of Nunavut. Once the NLCA was signed, 
the Federation was transformed into a corporation called Nunavut Tunngavik Incorporated.
10. Alcantara and Nelles 2013, p.7.
11. Loukacheva 2007; Henderson 2007, 2004; Légaré 2000.
12. The term “beneficiaries” applies to the persons who benefit from the land claim. Usually the 
procedure is defined in the land claim agreement and involves ethnicity and recognition by the 
community.
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This paper is based on an analysis of documentary sources (i.e., agreements, 
protocols, official declarations, news releases and newspapers articles). It should 
be mentioned, however, that some of the ideas developed in this paper have been 
inspired by formal and informal discussions with Nunavummiut.13
2. Overview of Inuit and Public Governance in 
Nunavut
Nunavut, one of the three Canadian territories, was created in April 1999 following 
the signing of the Nunavut Land Claim Agreement (NLCA) in 1993 by the federal 
government, the Northwest Territories and the Tungavik Federation of Nunavut. 
Nunavut was a compromise between the aspirations of many Inuit who wanted to 
have their own government, and the federal government which was more at ease 
with a public government.14 However, the Inuit negotiators were able to secure a 
form of Inuit governance in the NLCA through the creation of co-management 
boards and the institutionalization of Inuit participation in the development of 
social and cultural policies in Nunavut. Inuit negotiators insisted on institutional-
izing Inuit participation in the governance arrangements in order to protect Inuit 
rights in the event of an influx of Qallunaat15 in Nunavut.
2.1 Government of Nunavut
The Government of Nunavut (GN), the public arm of Nunavut governance, derives 
its authority from an act of the Parliament of Canada. The GN uses an adapted 
Westminster parliamentary system that functions without parties (Hicks and White 
2006). The members of the Nunavut Legislative Assembly (MNLA) are elected by 
all the Nunavummiut. Most have been and are Inuit, and so far every premier of 
Nunavut has been an Inuk. The GN is, therefore, a public government controlled 
by Inuit politicians. In the public service, the level of Inuit employment has hovered 
around 50 % since the creation of Nunavut,16 even though Article 23 of the NLCA 
states that Nunavut governments should have a representative level of Inuit employ-
13. Nunavummiut means ‘from Nunavut’- it refers to all the inhabitants, Inuit or Qallunaat, of the 
Nunavut Territory.
14. Abele and Rodon 2007.
15. Qallunaat is the word used to describe “white people” in Inuktitut. Inuit participation in the public 
service is covered by s. 21 of the NLCA; this is discussed further below.
16. The level of Inuit employment varies significantly by position, with the higher level at both the 
lower and higher positions. For more details see Timpson 2006.
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ees in all positions. The GN has pledged that Inuit employment levels will reflect the 
proportion of Inuit in the population by 2020, but this goal will probably be difficult 
to attain since most qualified Inuit are already working for the GN or Inuit organiza-
tions, and the education system is not turning out enough graduates.17
2.2 The Nunavut Land Claims Organizations
Inuit participation in Nunavut governance is centered on Nunavut Tunngavik 
Incorporated (NTI). NTI is an Inuit organization that was created to manage 
compensation funds allocated under the NLCA. In addition, three regional Inuit 
associations18 (RIAs) are associated with NTI. These regional associations manage 
Nunavut’s 350,000 km2 of Inuit-owned lands and deliver certain programs. NTI is 
mostly involved at the policy level.
The NTI mission statement emphasizes a watchdog role over the implementation 
of the NLCA by the federal and territorial government:
Nunavut Tunngavik Incorporated (NTI) ensures that the promises made in the Nu-
navut Land Claims Agreement (NLCA) are carried out. Inuit exchanged Aboriginal 
title to all their traditional land in the Nunavut Settlement Area for the rights and 
benefits set out in the NLCA. The management of land, water and wildlife is very 
important to Inuit. NTI coordinates and manages Inuit responsibilities set out in 
the NLCA and ensures that the federal and territorial governments fulfill their ob-
ligations.19
NTI also manages the $ 1.1 billion settlement fund through the Nunavut Trust. It 
receives 50 % of every first million dollars of royalties from oil, gas and mineral pro-
jects on Crown land. NTI also holds title to 38,000 km2 of Inuit-owned subsurface 
rights in areas identified for their mineral potential, and will therefore receive royal-
ties on resource development on these lands. It should be noted, however, that title to 
Inuit-owned surface land is vested in the three regional Inuit associations. The direc-
tors of each regional association are ex-officio members of NTI’s board of directors.
NTI also appoints half the members to each of the Nunavut land claims boards, 
also known as the “institutions of public governance” (IPGs). There are four IPGs: 
the Nunavut Wildlife Management Board (NWMB), the Nunavut Impact Review 
17. Berger 2006; Poelzer 2009, 2011.
18. These associations represent the three regions of Nunavut: the Qiktiqtani Inuit Association rep-
resenting the Baffin region, the Kivalliq Inuit Association representing west Hudson Bay, and the 
Kitikmeot Inuit Association representing the western part of Nunavut.
19. From NTI website : http://www.tunngavik.com/about/
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Board (NIRB), the Nunavut Water Board (NWB) and the Nunavut Planning Com-
mission (NPC). Half of the IPG members are either directly appointed as in the 
case of the NWMB, or nominated by the Inuit organizations and appointed by the 
relevant federal minister,20 as is the case for the other IPGs. With the exception of 
the NWMB which has decision-making power (albeit subject to federal ministerial 
review)21, these boards only have the power to issue recommendations. In practice, 
however, they hold quasi decision-making power22, and as such are an important 
element of policy making in Nunavut. These boards provide a good example of hori-
zontal and vertical multilevel governance because they involve both state and non-
state actors on the one hand, and the GN and the federal government on the other.
NTI and the regional Inuit organizations also play an economic and social role 
through the implementation of the Inuit Impact and Benefit Agreements (IIBA) 
under Article 26 of the NLCA. This article ensures that all new development will 
benefit Inuit through an obligation to conclude an agreement with the concerned 
Land Claims Organizations (LCOs). IIBAs usually involve compensation, guaran-
teed employment, training funds and community investments. IIBAs are a power-
ful instrument of economic and social development, and they are negotiated by 
NTI and regional Inuit organizations without any participation from the GN or the 
Nunavut municipalities.
NTI also ensures that the other parties respect their obligations. Indeed, it has 
filed a one-billion-dollar lawsuit against the federal government for breach of con-
tract over the implementation of the NLCA, especially with regard to the lack of 
training funds for the implementation of section 23.23
Finally, under Article 32 of the NLCA, the GN must give Inuit the opportunity to 
participate in the development of social and cultural programs and policies:
32.1.1 Without limiting any rights of Inuit or any obligations of Government, out-
side of the Agreement, Inuit have the right as set out in this Article to participate in 
the development of social and cultural policies, and in the design of social and cul-
tural programs and services, including their method of delivery, within the Nunavut 
Settlement Area.
20. To date no federal minister has ever refused to appoint a candidate proposed by an Inuit organiza-
tion, and it is very unlikely that the minister will refuse.
21. The minister has already reviewed a NWMB decision twice. In both cases it was about quotas for 
turbot. For more details see Rodon 2003.
22. White 2002.
23. NTI, December 6, 2006. To date NTI has won four motions and an appeal, but the federal govern-
ment has launched another appeal (NTI 2012).
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Section 32 called for the creation of a Nunavut Social Development Council (NSDC) 
for the purpose of consulting the Inuit. The NSDC was set up as an independent 
organization, but in 2002 NTI decided to disband the independent council and take 
over its responsibilities. At the time NTI claimed it had taken action because the 
NSDC hadn’t performed as expected,24 but the decision can also be seen as a way 
for NTI to strengthen its authority with regard to the GN by requiring the GN to 
consult with NTI to meet the requirements of section 32.
NTI is also the only settlement organization in Nunavut, and is the signatory of 
the land claims that created the government of Nunavut. This reinforces the MLG 
characteristics of policy making in Nunavut, and distinguishes it from more tradi-
tional Canadian federalism.
3. Working Together
NTI is such an important actor in the Nunavut public policy process that the GN 
signed an agreement with NTI to delineate their relationship. The initial agreement 
– the Clyde River Protocol – was signed in October 1999 and reviewed in 2004 when 
it was redubbed Iqqanaijaqatigiit: Working Together. The latest version, signed in 
2011, is called Aajiiqatigiinniq: Working Together. These documents, which detail 
the relationship between GN and NTI, are in essence MLG agreements.
In the first section titled “Mutual Recognition”, NTI recognizes the GN as a legiti-
mate public government and acknowledges that the GN, in exercising its juris-
diction as a democratic and responsible public government, must serve the needs 
and priorities of all citizens of Nunavut in a fair and equitable manner. This is an 
important statement in which an aboriginal corporation acknowledges a public 
government and confirms the presence of competing legitimacies. For its part the 
GN recognizes that NTI represents the Inuit of Nunavut and acknowledges that NTI 
has a special place in Nunavut affairs as the primary Inuit organization mandated 
to speak for the beneficiaries of the NLCA with respect to their rights and benefits 
under the agreement. The GN further acknowledges that NTI’s mandate embraces 
additional responsibilities designed to protect and promote the interests of the Inuit 
as an aboriginal people, a unique situation in Canada.
The different versions of the document also recognize the areas of mutual inter-
est between the parties. In addition, the Clyde River and Iqqanaijaqatigiit versions 
of Working Together established a process for information sharing and meetings 
between the GN premier and NTI president, and between senior officials of the 
24. D’Souza 2002.
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two organizations. Finally, they delineated a process for discussing and resolving 
disputes. Aajiiqatigiinniq does not mention this last point, but instead insists on the 
principles of a positive working relationship and the commitment to work together, 
a sign that there was a need to improve ties and foster a more positive relationship.
As an agreement, Working Together clearly recognizes NTI’s governance role in 
Nunavut and places it at almost the same level as the GN, thus acknowledging the 
horizontal multilevel framework established by the NLCA.
Nevertheless, NTI is not an Inuit government, but rather a non-profit corpora-
tion whose shareholders are NLCA Inuit beneficiaries. NTI is headed by a board of 
directors, and all Inuit beneficiaries of the NLCA directly elect the president and 
two members. It should be noted, however, that turnout has been quite low, with 
a participation rate under 50 percent.25 The remaining members are appointed by 
the regional Inuit associations, and the president of the Nunavut Trust, the body in 
charge of managing the settlement monies, is an ex-officio member.
The NLCA has clearly created a horizontal multilevel governance framework. 
NTI has the power to select half the IPG members, and its president is directly 
elected by NCLA beneficiaries. For NCLA chief negotiator Paul Quassa, as for many 
Nunavummiut, the GN and NTI should at the very least be placed on the same level:
The government of Nunavut and NTI are on the same level. I used to jokingly say 
that Nunavut is like France. In France they have a prime minister and a president. 
Some countries are like that. It seems like we are like that, too, in Nunavut; we have a 
president and a premier. I think NTI should be at a higher level … The public votes 
for the president of NTI, whereas the premier is only voted in by the cabinet. I like 
to refer to Nunavut as its own country with its own president and its own premier. 
That’s how I see it.26
Nonetheless, NTI does not meet the requirements of a public organization or gov-
ernment. It is a non-profit corporation with private status, and therefore it can 
withhold information from the public and is not bound by processes of access to 
information. NTI has made efforts to be transparent, and its members and board 
of directors meetings are open to beneficiaries, media and the general public. Min-
utes of resolutions passed during the meetings are available to beneficiaries upon 
request. NTI also produces various reports each year, including annual reports pro-
viding information on activities and presenting financial statements. However, since 
25. Bell 2001; Henderson 2007, 2004.
26. Quassa 2008: 187.
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it is a non-profit corporation, its agreements with other corporations are usually not 
accessible to the public.27
NTI has also been accused of conflict of interest, because as a non-profit corpora-
tion it can enter into partnerships with other corporations. For example, through 
its partnership with Kaminak Corporation, NTI has effectively become a partner in 
uranium exploration and mining.28 At the same time, as the body representing the 
Inuit of Nunavut, NTI also nominates the Inuit representatives to the Nunavut Impact 
Review Board, the institution of public governance that will assess projects involving 
the NTI partnership. Therefore, there is at least an appearance of conflict of interest.
All the same, the conflict between the GN and NTI should not be interpreted 
primarily as tension between Inuit and public governance. Both the GN and NTI are 
controlled by Inuit and employ Qallunaat lawyers, experts and consultants. The dif-
ference between the GN and NTI is a difference in nature: the GN is a government, 
and NTI is a nonprofit corporation. It is also a difference in representativeness: the 
GN represents all the Nunavummiut, while NTI serves only the beneficiaries of the 
NLCA, in other word the Inuit in Nunavut.
3.1 Financial Autonomy and Economic Power
In order to understand the power configuration between NTI and GN, it is impor-
tant to assess their financial autonomy and economic power.
The GN is 95 percent dependent on financial transfers from the federal gov-
ernment through the Territorial Formula Financing (TFF) Program, the Canada 
Health Transfer (CHT) and the Canada Social Transfer (CST). The remaining funds 
are acquired through various tax revenues. For 2011–12, the GN had projected 
revenues of $ 1.35 billion.29
The Nunavut government does not receive any revenues from resource devel-
opment, because being a territory, it does not have jurisdiction over lands and 
resources. Following the precedent set by the Yukon and more recently the North-
west Territories, the GN is in the process of trying to obtain these additional pow-
ers through a devolution process. However, a recent federal report on devolution 
concluded that, at the present time, the GN does not have the capacity to assume 
additional responsibilities.30 It should be noted that since most mines are located 
27. QIA has just signed an IIBA with Baffinland and has provided a plain language version of the 
agreement on its website (QIA 2013). So there is clearly a push for more transparency amongst 
Inuit organizations.
28. Kaminak Corporation, May 8, 2008; NTI, February 7, 2008.
29. Government of Nunavut 2011.
30. Mayer 2007.
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on Inuit land, devolution would not necessarily help the GN as the revenues would 
still flow to NTI.31 This means that for the short and medium term, the GN has a 
fixed income and cannot increase revenues beyond inflation and local tax hikes.32
NTI obtains its revenues from the interest incurred from the compensation fund 
administered by the Nunavut Trust, as well as from the royalties on the first million 
dollars generated from resource development projects on Crown land in Nunavut 
and on the 3 % of subsurface rights owned by the Inuit of Nunavut. In addition, NTI 
has other minor sources of income. Total NTI revenues for 2011 were $ 20,813,069. 
The organization also expects to receive $ 1 million in 2012 for exploration on Inuit-
owned land.33 In addition, the three regional Inuit associations receive royalties 
stemming from resource development projects on Inuit-owned lands, which cover a 
third of Nunavut’s surface resources. With NTI, they also negotiate the Inuit Impact 
and Benefit Agreements (IIBAs) required for all development projects in Nunavut 
under Article 26 of the NLCA.
3.2 Overlapping Responsibilities
The recognition of NTI and GN mutual interests in the different versions of Work-
ing Together is a clear indication that they have overlapping responsibilities in many 
areas. The appendices to these documents contain a long list of subjects covering 
intergovernmental affairs, economic development, social and cultural development, 
education, training and language, and the environment.
However, it is important to distinguish the areas where the GN and the Inuit 
organizations deliver overlapping programs and services (for example, in wildlife 
management, support for hunters, benefits for elders, compassionate travel pro-
gram, and economic development) from the areas where the GN has sole respon-
sibility for delivery, such as health and social policy (29 % of the 2013–14 Nuna-
vut budget) and education (16 %)34, even though NTI is working with the GN to 
develop an Inuit cultural school, and develops and finances language materials.
The most obvious overlapping areas are the hunter support programs provided 
by both NTI and the GN, and the wildlife management responsibilities shared by 
31. See McPherson (2003) for an account of how the Inuit have sought to identify potential mining 
sites during the land selection process.
32. Abele and Prince 2008.
33. NTI Annual Report 2012 available at: http://www.tunngavik.com/files/2012/11/NTI-2012-Annu-
al-Report-Web.pdf
34. Government of Nunavut Main Estimates 2013–2014: http://www.finance.gov.nu.ca/apps/fetch/
download.aspx?file=Budgets%2FMain%2BEstimates%
2F634988576461875000–663546179–2013–14 %2BMain%2BEstimates%2B-%2BEN.pdf
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both the NWMB and the Nunavut Department of the Environment. Economic 
development is also an overlapping responsibility: the GN, NTI and the three RIAs 
all have an economic development department or organization working to foster 
economic development.
Nonetheless, the costlier policies in areas such as health and social services and 
education are funded entirely by the GN.35 In practice, this means that NTI partici-
pates directly in the elaboration of these policies in the earliest stages. This creates 
an unusual situation, since NTI is heavily involved in public policy design, but is not 
responsible for the cost of implementation. Conflict ensues when NTI petitions for 
more generous or costly programs than the GN can afford. NTI and the RIAs, on the 
other hand, are sure to benefit from resource exploitation and are already geared to 
do so. However, some Inuit organization leaders are very reluctant to invest in social 
policies, as shown in the following exchange between Donald Havioyak, president 
of the Kitikmeot Inuit Association (KIA), and Leona Agglukaq, Nunavut’s former 
minister of health. When the minister asked KIA to share information on the Inuit 
Impact and Benefit Agreement (IIBA) negotiations, in order to address rising rates 
of alcoholism, drug abuse, and violence against women and children in the region, 
Havioyak responded that providing social services was not in KIA’s mandate.36 It is 
true that Inuit organizations have no mandate to provide social programs. Neverthe-
less, in terms of financial capacity, Inuit organizations are well placed to negotiate 
advantageous deals with mining companies, an option that will not be available to 
the GN until it obtains control over Crown land resources through devolution.
In fact, the GN’s lack of jurisdiction over Nunavut’s land and resources leaves it 
struggling to provide adequate services to Nunavummiut. There are two solutions to 
this conundrum. The GN could ask for an increase in federal transfer payments or for 
devolution of control over resources from the federal government. Neither is likely to 
happen in the near future. In the first case, the federal government has not given any 
indication that it will significantly increase Nunavut’s budget37; in the second case, as 
noted above, the Mayer report on devolution concluded that Nunavut lacks the capac-
ity to administer additional responsibilities.38 Nonetheless, in early 2009 the federal 
government appointed a representative to examine the feasibility of devolution.39
A “third way” would be to have an open discussion between the Inuit organiza-
tions and the GN on the use of land and resource revenues from Inuit and Nunavut 
35. NTI implements Inuit elder’s benefits and has a compassionate travel program, but the funding is 
partly provided by the GN.
36. Quoted in Thompson 2007.
37. Abele and Prince 2008.
38. Mayer 2007.
39. Canada, January 15, 2009.
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land. The Inuit are in dire need of funds for education and social policies. The new 
money generated by mining activities could be used to alleviate Nunavut’s social 
problems and build capacity.
Still, channeling money generated by resource development to fund social policy 
would not be easy. The NLCA has created a governance structure that vests respon-
sibility for social policy in the GN, an institution with no access to independent 
sources of revenue, and limits access to resource revenues to Inuit organizations 
that do not always acknowledge having social responsibilities.40
4. Mapping out Authorities and Legitimacies in 
Nunavut Public Policies
In this section we assess how Nunavut horizontal multilevel governance affects the 
public policy process by looking at the interaction between NTI and the GN on two 
public policy issues. In particular, we explore how the two institutions are mapping 
out their authority and legitimacy throughout the policy process.
In spite of the Iqqanaijaqatigiit protocol, relations between the GN and NTI have 
not always been harmonious, and conflict has arisen over a number of issues. These 
conflicts are often related to the cost of measures, but sometimes stem from deeper 
disagreements over policy goals. In these cases, NTI acts like an opposition party, a 
function that does not exist in the Nunavut Legislative Assembly.
Finally, in some instances, conflict arises about who has the authority to decide on 
public policy, especially when it is related to the NLCA. The GN, as a public govern-
ment, considers that it has the authority to decide after proper consultation. NTI, as 
the protector of Inuit rights and a signatory of the NLCA, considers that it has a veto 
over all public policy decisions concerning Inuit rights and NLCA implementation.
Two examples will be examined: one where the disagreement concerns implemen-
tation of an aspect of the NLCA (the Nunavummi Nangminiqaqtunik Ikajuuti policy), 
and one where NTI acted more like an opposition party (the Inuit Language Act).
4.1 Nunavummi Nangminiqaqtunik Ikajuuti policy
The Nunavummi Nangminiqaqtunik Ikajuuti (NNI) policy stems from section 24 
of the NLCA, which states that Inuit-owned businesses should be given preferential 
access to government contracts. In order to fulfill this obligation, the GN, in close 
consultation with NTI, proposed the NNI policy in 2000, and it was subsequently 
40. Mifflin 2009.
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announced jointly. Furthermore, the NTI president at the time declared that, with 
this policy, the GN was acting in compliance with Article 24.41
However, two disagreements eventually surfaced between NTI and the GN over 
the policy. The first was over the criteria for appeal. The GN had decided that the 
criteria should be strictly related to the NNI policy, but NTI felt the criteria should 
be based directly on Article 24. This position completely undermined the policy by 
making the NLCA the sole grounds for appeal. To deal with the dispute, an “Agree-
ment of Settlement” was concluded on August 4, 2002 between NTI and the GN, 
and a facilitator was appointed to settle the appeal board issue between the parties.42 
The crisis was resolved when the parties agreed to the “Terms of Reference for 
the Board” developed by the facilitator. The terms of reference were subsequently 
included in the NNI policy.
But the most significant conflict with regards to the NNI policy was the use of a 
grandfathering clause that gave businesses more time to adapt to the new policy. The 
GN extended the grace period to one year to allow Nunavut businesses enough time 
to comply with the new rules. NTI strongly opposed this decision, indicating that it 
had not been properly consulted by the GN, and filed a motion asking the court to 
repeal the GN cabinet decision on the grounds that it violated NLCA requirements. 
The dispute was settled out of court and NTI ensured that the GN would not extend 
the grace period any further.43
At the heart of the controversy over the NNI policy is the question of who has 
authority over public policy relating to NLCA implementation. All moves by NTI 
to date have clearly been a way of asserting its veto over such matters. It has suc-
cessfully asserted its authority by forcing the GN to go to mediation to establish the 
appeal board, and by filing a lawsuit over the extension of a grace period, obliging 
the GN to come to an agreement with NTI.
The debate over NNI was the first major disagreement between the GN and NTI. 
It not only showed the difficulties created by horizontal multilevel governance, but 
also highlighted different conceptions of NLCA implementation. The debate cen-
tered on the Nunavut economy and the place of the Inuit within that economy. The 
GN was afraid that an overly strict approach to the NNI would negatively affect the 
economy of the new territory, while NTI wanted to ensure that benefits from the 
new opportunities created by the NLCA start flowing to the Inuit as quickly as pos-
sible. In 2011, NTI’s president again questioned the NNI policy, especially in terms 
41. Quoted in Bell 2002.
42. Janda 2006.
43. Ibid.
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of benefiting small Inuit business.44 She requested and obtained an independent 
program review, which was conducted in 2012.
4.2 Inuit Language Protection Act
The second case concerns language legislation, a very contentious subject in Nuna-
vut and in Canada more generally.45 In 2007 the GN introduced legislation to 
protect and promote the Inuit language.46 A committee made up of officials from 
NTI, the GN, the federal government and the office of the Nunavut languages com-
missioner developed the legislation.47 Here again, the GN adopted a collaborative 
approach, and NTI was closely involved in the policy process. The committee expe-
rienced numerous difficulties while working on the legislation, with various mem-
bers threatening to resign, but finally produced a draft that secured initial NTI sup-
port.48 Before long, however, NTI began criticizing the status of the Inuit language 
under the bill, and the delay in its implementation of bilingual education. With 
regards to the status of Inuktitut, the GN proposed that cabinet be given the power 
to order that certain laws be published in the Inuit language, and to decide that the 
Inuit language versions of certain territorial laws be declared legally authoritative. 
NTI argued that all laws and regulations should be translated in Inuktitut if the Inuit 
language was to be equal to French and English.49 It was clearly a cost issue, given 
that translating all the laws and regulations would be very expensive. The following 
exchange between NTI President Paul Kaludjak and Tunnuniq MLA James Arvaluk 
during the hearings held by the Standing Committee Ajauqtiit50 is a good illustra-
tion of the divergent points of view: “We can’t take away from essential services 
[…] we have to consider other impacts on government operations,” Arvaluk said. 
Kaludjak replied by warning that NTI would use its lawyers if its demands weren’t 
met, and said “I don’t think we should be concentrating on the expense part of it.”51
The second disagreement was over the delay in implementing bilingual educa-
tion, and was similar in nature. The issue was one of pragmatism versus principle. 
The conflict over the Inuit Language Protection Act was therefore a more classic case, 
44. George 2011.
45. Timpson 2009.
46. “Inuit language” is used here to refer the two main dialects of Nunavut, Inuktitut and Inuinnaqtun.
47. Bell 2007a.
48. Ibid.
49. NTI, June 6, 2007; NTI, June 2, 2008.
50. Standing Committee on Legislation. One of the five standing committee of the Legislative As-
sembly of Nunavut.
51. Quoted in Bell, 2007b.
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in which NTI played the role of an advocacy group trying to convince the govern-
ment to increase funding and to implement reforms more quickly.
I have emphasized conflict because it is more visible than cooperative behavior, but 
the relationship between NTI and the GN has not always been marked by conflict. 
There are examples of cooperation and partnership, as Paul Quassa has emphasized:
Before we had our Nunavut government I stated that NTI and the government of 
Nunavut had to work as partners in order to move forward. A partnership always 
makes something stronger, whatever it is. The Nunavut government didn’t have lots 
of money for government offices or the Legislative Assembly. The Inuit organizations 
built these facilities and the government now rents them. NTI used their business 
arm to get them built. That’s a partnership.52
In fact, cooperative behaviors seem to occur mostly when there is a conflict with the 
federal government. For example, the GN and NTI worked together in the fight to 
obtain a fishing and shrimp quota for Nunavut, in opposing the federal gun control 
law, in the effort to secure more federal funding for housing in Nunavut, in the nego-
tiations with the federal government about devolution, and in the conflict over imple-
mentation of the NLCA. On this last issue, NTI filed a lawsuit against the federal 
government for breach of contract with regards to the implementation of the NLCA.
The GN and NTI also had success in developing a Nunavut economic develop-
ment strategy known as Sivummut, which was prepared by a committee co-chaired 
by the NTI president and the Nunavut minister responsible for economic develop-
ment. The GN and NTI have also worked together to establish an Inuit cultural 
school in Clyde River.
The relationship between the GN and NTI is unique, quite complex, and at times 
tense. The uneasiness is often perceived as tension between Inuit and public gov-
ernance, but as we have seen, both institutions are Inuit controlled. Analyzing the 
conflict along these lines would explain little. Tensions could also be seen as the 
result of conflict between a government and a lobby group, but NTI is not simply 
an advocacy organization promoting Inuit rights. In fact, the GN and NTI have a 
two-pronged relationship, one marked by competing authority and legitimacy, and 
the other by an advocacy role.
The GN and NTI each have their own sources of authority and legitimacy. The 
GN has the authority entrusted in it by the Nunavut Act, and the legitimacy of a 
public government elected by all the Nunavummiut. NTI derives its authority from 
being the signatory and guardian of the NLCA. It can be seen as an Inuit govern-
52. Quassa 2008: 193.
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ment that delivers some services to Inuit and advocates for their rights, but it also 
often acts as an official opposition. In fact the conflicts between NTI and the GN 
can be interpreted as the effort of two institutions to assert their respective authority 
in a unique and unprecedented multilevel governance arrangement. Unlike other 
MLG arrangements where non-state actors have been incorporated into an existing 
and established governance system, Nunavut was created with this system in place 
from the very beginning.
Conclusion
Nunavut governance offers a good example of MLG and clearly fits the definition 
proposed by Alcantara and Nelles53: various governmental (federal, GN) and non-
governmental actors (NTI and the three regional Inuit organizations) represent 
different territorial scales (federal, territorial, and regional), and decision-making 
processes are constantly being renegotiated.
NTI is an integral part of Nunavut governance, and has a legitimate and impor-
tant role in the public policy process, especially in a system where there is no formal 
opposition in the legislative assembly. As an advocate for and protector of Inuit 
rights, NTI also ensures that the letter and spirit of the NLCA are respected, and 
guarantees that the territorial government never forgets the fundamental reason for 
which it was created – to allow self-government for the Inuit of Nunavut, even in the 
event that they one day no longer constitute the majority in the territory.
Horizontal multilevel governance is therefore a reality in Nunavut, but it creates 
its own set of challenges for both the GN and NTI. First, NTI’s multiple political and 
economic roles place it in a potential conflict of interest situation with respect to cer-
tain issues. Second, as a non-profit corporation answerable solely to its beneficiaries, 
NTI lacks the political accountability of a public organization, even though it plays 
an important role in Nunavut public policy, delivering various services to Inuit, 
advocating for their rights, nominating or appointing members to the institution 
of public governance, and often acting as an unofficial opposition. Finally, despite 
NTI’s overlapping responsibilities with the GN in many areas, the most expensive 
programs and services – education, and health and welfare – are delivered by the 
GN, which derives the vast majority of its revenue from federal transfers, whereas 
NTI and the three regional Inuit associations are bound to benefit extensively from 
future resource development.
53. Alcantara and Nelles 2013 p. 7.
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For the GN the main issue is to develop better cooperation with NTI, especially 
in the area of resource revenue sharing. This can only occur if the GN does not act 
as the sole representative of the public interest, thus acknowledging the horizontal 
multilevel governance established by the NLCA. Multilevel governance frameworks 
entail a redefinition of the role of government that includes a dispersion of power 
and authority beyond government, and Nunavut is a good example of this.
However, the Nunavut governance arrangement raises a number of questions. 
First, what role should NTI play in public policy development? At present, NTI 
develops policies with the GN, demands and sometimes exercises a veto on issues 
related to NLCA implementation, and in some cases plays the role of an advocacy 
group and unofficial opposition. It would be important to develop a clearer set of 
rules addressing these issues in the next protocol between the GN and NTI, in order 
to achieve more collaboration between these two actors.
Second, does the status of NTI allow for sufficient accountability? At this point, 
the three elected members of the NTI Board of Directors are elected by Inuit benefi-
ciaries and are accountable to their board, which is mainly composed of appointed 
members from the regional Inuit associations and the Nunavut Trust. Furthermore, 
land claims organizations have the status of nonprofit corporations and are thus 
protected from access to information requests. This status is not necessarily compat-
ible with the public role played by LCOs.
Third, do NTI’s multiple roles in resource development create a potential for con-
flict of interest? Until recently this was a theoretical question. However, when NTI 
became a partner with a uranium company, the possibility of a conflict of interest 
arose because half the members of the Impact Review Board tasked with assessing 
uranium mining projects are appointed by NTI.
Finally, and probably most importantly, how should resource revenues be con-
trolled and used? The GN bears the cost of most social programs and all health 
and education services, but has no access to revenues from resource development 
in Nunavut. The devolution of land and resources from the federal government is 
widely seen as the answer to this problem, but the Inuit organizations could also be 
part of the solution. Some Inuit organizations are recognizing they have a role to 
play in alleviating social problems, but the GN and the Inuit organizations need to 
find a way to collaborate more closely to address these issues. One creative solution 
would be to develop a partnership for the delivery of certain programs, as is already 
the case for the Clyde River Cultural School; this would give NTI the influence it 
seeks in public policy and allow the GN to access more funds for social policies.
To conclude, the Nunavut experience is still young. With its unique system of 
Inuit and public governance, contradictions, tensions and conflicts like the ones 
discussed in this paper are to be expected and are a sign that Nunavut is a healthy 
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polity. However, if Nunavut is to succeed, these questions will have to be addressed. 
The experience with the negotiation of the Language Act shows that conflict can 
delay important legislation, and waste money and energy, both of which are scarce 
in Nunavut. A more cooperative approach to policy making and implementation on 
the part of the GN and NTI is necessary to strengthen policy making and achieve 
greater policy coherence and efficiency in Nunavut.
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